

Fisher Separation Theorem & Consumer Optimization

1. TWO-PERIOD CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT IN ABSENCE OF RISK

Consider the condition of the consumer in a two-period world. The consumer faces the choice between consumption now and consumption later. This choice is conditioned by an income stream of y_0 now and y_1 in the next period. The choice is also conditioned by market forces that we will describe in a moment.

The consumer acts to maximize utility, which is a function of current and future consumption. The utility function, $U(C_0, C_1)$, is assumed to satisfy the normal assumptions. These are downward sloping and convex indifference curves. Indifference curves map combinations of current consumption (horizontal axis) and future consumption (vertical) that yield equal levels of lifetime happiness. These indifference curves are downward sloping because more is preferred to less. They are convex because there is a diminishing tradeoff between consumption in the two periods. That is, as the individual consumes more and more in the current period, consumption in the future becomes relatively more attractive. The slope of the indifference curve is the consumers' individual rate of time preference.

Consumers differ in their time preference. If a consumer were forced to consume at the point of $\{y_0, y_1\}$ the slope of the indifference curve would reflect the consumer's time preference. If the slope were less than 1 in absolute value (it is negative by assumption above), the consumer could be said to favor the future over the present. If the slope were greater than $|1|$, the consumer could be said to favor the present over the future. That is, consumer with indifference curves with slopes less than $|1|$ feel less cost from postponed current consumption than consumers with indifference curves with slopes greater than $|1|$. However, this is purely hypothetical because we cannot observe these indifference curves.

The consumer is not forced to live hand to mouth, however. The consumer faces capital market opportunities. We will develop these in stages. First, assume that the consumer can borrow or save through simple bank accounts on which the consumer is paid an interest rate i . This means that the consumers' budget constraint looks like

$$C_1 = y_1 + (y_0 - C_0)(1 + i).$$

Current income can be passed to the future at the rate of $1+i$. Likewise future income can be passed to the present at the same rate. This budget constraint is a straight line with the slope

$$\frac{dC_1}{dC_0} = -(1 + i).$$

This capital market opportunity allows the consumer choice that the consumer uses to maximize utility. The consumer chooses the set of consumption now as opposed to later in a way that makes him better off than would be the case if stuck with $\{y_0, y_1\}$. This capital market opportunity also allows us, as researchers, to observe behavior and label it according to our theory. If the consumer saves current income for future consumption, then the consumer's individual rate of time preference at $\{y_0, y_1\}$ is less than the market's. If the consumer borrows from future income to service current consumption, then the consumer's rate of time preference

at $\{y_0, y_1\}$ is greater than the market's. In the absence of any productivity of investment, the market rate of interest would be determined by the relative number of people willing to borrow or lend.¹ Notice that as the budget line pivots on the point $\{y_0, y_1\}$ as the interest rate changes any consumer can shift from being a lender to becoming a borrower if the interest rate falls sufficiently. This is the demand for borrowing/supply of savings function. Still, individuals vary in their relative demand/supply.

Next, assume that the consumer has the opportunity to invest his savings (if he chooses to save) in productive capital projects. Let there be an investment productivity function that maps savings into future income. This project curve starts at the point $\{y_0, y_1\}$; initially its slope is steeper than the bank borrowing line (capital market line), but the slope diminishes as more is invested. The slope of this investment productivity function represents the marginal return on individual investment opportunities. The individual chooses the level of investment that maximizing utility. In the absence of access to the capital market, the consumer chooses to invest up to the point where the slope of the investment productivity frontier is equal to the slope of the indifference curve that is tangent to it. This is the highest level of utility achievable by the consumer. It also has the characteristic that the consumer's individual rate of time preference is equal to the marginal return on investment; call this, r .

Finally, if the consumer has both the availability of productive investment projects and access to the capital market, the individual can expand utility even further. In this world the consumer invests along the capital project frontier up to the point where the marginal rate of return implied by the slope of this frontier is equal to the interest rate. That is, investment occurs until r is equal to i . The consumer then either borrows or lends beyond this tangency to the point where the highest indifference curve is tangent to this "expanded" capital market line. The efficient capital project level has a payoff of $P_1 - y_1$ from the investment $y_0 - P_0$.

2. OPTIMAL INVESTMENT

This result is called the *Fisher Separation Theorem*. It says that in the presence of perfect capital markets, the consumer's investment and consumption decisions are independent. All consumers invest along their capital project frontiers to the point where $r = i$, and then borrow or save to satisfy their own personal rate of time preference. The Theorem has a number of important implications:

1. All investment opportunities are exploited.
2. All investment opportunities are priced the same, that is, priced by the same condition, $r = i$.
3. Efficient management of investment projects is achieved by maximizing the present value of the investment. That is, $\max P_1$ occurs where $dP_1 / dP_0 = (1+i)$. (Note that the minus sign goes away because P_0 is measured backwards on the horizontal axis.) Or in present value terms,

$$dP_0 = \frac{dP_1}{1+i}.$$

¹This number is generally determined by life cycle forces in context of multi-period models—things like lifetime wage profiles.

This last point leads us to the conclusion that firms, which are the economic agents that manage production and investment, should act to maximize present value.

3. WEALTH, RISK, & UTILITY

Next we begin to develop the Capital Asset Pricing Model, or CAPM. CAPM attempts to explain the way that assets like stocks and bonds are priced. It does this without resorting to idiosyncratic characteristics.

Science is empirical and the best science is empirical and elegant. I like to think of the best, most elegant scientific theories as magic tricks. It is like pulling a rabbit out of a hat. Demand Theory is like this. Demand theory starts with the absolutely unobservable notion of a utility function and from that, derives completely empirical predictions. Similarly, CAPM starts with what seems to be a “tired” definition of risk aversion and then is able to explain nearly all of the cross-sectional variation in the prices of securities.

We start with the theory of the utility of wealth when the level of wealth is uncertain. Before we begin, there are a couple of statistical properties that are useful to understand.

First, we define the notion of expected value. $E(x) = \sum_i p_i x_i$, that is, the expected value of the random variable x is the probability times the value of x summed over all possible values that x can take. A probability function defines all of these and sums the associated probabilities to 1. For continuous distributions, the density function replaces p_i . For the normal this is

$$n(x) = \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{x-\mu}{\sigma}\right)^2}$$

The continuous density is integrated rather than summed over its range. The integral of the density is 1 and the expected value of x is μ .

$$\int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} n(x; \mu, \sigma) dx = 1$$

$$E(x) = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} x \cdot n(x; \mu, \sigma) dx = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} x \cdot \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{x-\mu}{\sigma}\right)^2} dx = \mu$$

From the definition of expected value we can derive the result that the expected value of x plus a constant a is just a plus the expected value of x . Similarly, the expected value of x times a constant is the constant times the expected value of x .

The second definition is that of the variance. $Var(x) = E[(x_i - E(x))^2]$. Applying the definition of the expected value, we have $Var(x) = \sum_i p_i (x - E(x))^2$. From this definition, rules of association also follow. The variance of a random variable x plus a constant a is equal to the variance of x alone. The constant falls out. Next, the variance of x times a constant is equal to the constant squared times the variance of x .

Axioms of choice

- Comparability (Completeness)
- Transitivity
- Strong Independence
 - A gamble involving x and z will yield the same utility as an identical gamble involving y and z if consumer is indifferent between x and y .
- Measurability
 - If y is preferred to x and z is preferred to y , there exists a gamble involving x and z to which the consumer is indifferent compared to y .
- Ranking
 - If both y and u lie between x and z , the gamble that equates $\{x, z\}$ to y can be compared to the gamble that equates $\{x, z\}$ to u . If the probability associated with x in the y -equivalent gamble is greater than the probability associated with x in the u -equivalent gamble, then u is preferred to y .

Utility of Risky Outcomes

Define risky events in terms of a gamble. That is, let's say that a consumer will receive x dollars with probability α and z with probability $(1-\alpha)$. The expected value of this is some number, call it y . In a gamble, the consumer does not get the expected value. The consumer gets either x or z . That is the problem. The question is, Does the consumer like the gambling nature of the problem? That is, would the consumer be happier with y or happier with the gamble, which will yield either x or z .

To answer this, let's define the consumer's utility in the event of the gamble. The utility of x is $U(x)$ and the utility of z is $U(z)$. The consumer's expected utility from the gamble is, then, $\alpha U(x) + (1-\alpha)U(z)$. This is called the expected utility of uncertain wealth, or $E(U(W))$.

We can compare the expected utility of uncertain wealth to the utility of certain wealth that has the same expected value as the gamble. Call this the utility of expected wealth, or $U(E(W))$. In our example, the utility of expected wealth is the utility level associated with the dollar value y because that is the expected value of a gamble. So, $U(E(W)) = U(y)$. This is not the utility of the gamble. The utility of expected wealth is the utility of the money- certain value of the expected value of the risky outcome. On the other hand, the expected utility of uncertain wealth is the utility of the gamble itself.

Expected utility is the utility of the wealth outcome in each possible event times the probability of that event,

$$1. \quad E(U) = \sum U(x)p(x)$$

or in continuous terms it is the utility of wealth at each level of x times the continuous density of x , integrated over all possible values:

$$2. \quad E(U) = \int U(x)f(x)dx$$

If the utility of the money-certain expected value of the risky outcome is greater than the expected utility of the risky outcome, then the consumer is labeled **risk averse**. The picture tells the story.

From the picture, we can see how much in money terms the consumer will pay to avoid risk, for risk averse consumers. For risk-loving consumers we can see how much the consumer will pay to gamble. Friedman and Savage drew a little picture to try to explain how a consumer could be a gambler and an insurer all at the same time.² Cute. Their theory has a few holes, but generally it is a reasonable way to think about this problem. We are not so much interested in refining our understanding of utility theory, but rather, we want to put the definition of risk aversion to work with wealth maximization.

Mean-Variance Paradigm

To do this, let's look at the risky world in terms of the appreciation of assets. Let the appreciation of wealth of wealth be defined as:³

$$R = \frac{W_1 - W_0}{W_0}$$

The expected value of the appreciation of wealth is:

$$E(R) = \frac{E(W_1)}{W_0} - 1$$

which, based on our discussion at the beginning of this lecture, is distributed with a variance:

$$\sigma_R^2 = \frac{\sigma_w^2}{W_0^2}$$

Utility can be defined in terms of the appreciation in the value of wealth, which is defined by its expected value and its standard deviation:

$$U = U(W_0, R(E(R), \sigma))$$

In this way the expected value of utility can be defined. Using the continuous distribution formula, the expected value of utility is the integral of utility over each value of the appreciation of wealth times the density at that value:

$$3. \quad E(U) = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} U(W_0, R) f(R; E(R), \sigma^2) dR$$

² Friedman and Savage, "Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk," *JPE*, 1948, in AEA Readings in Price Theory.

³ The book is a bit idiosyncratic in this regard, suggesting that the wealth of an individual is tied up in one asset. This is not the right way to think about the problem. Assume that wealth is held in a diversified portfolio of assets.

Assume that the distribution of the return on wealth is normal. That is, let $f(.)=n(.)$. Then we can use the normal variant:

$$Z = \frac{R - E(R)}{\sigma}$$

Rewriting in terms of R gives:

$$R = E(R) + \sigma Z$$

Substituting this into the expected utility function gives:

$$4. \quad E(U) = \int U(W_0, E(R) + \sigma Z) n(Z;0,1) dZ$$

Note that (4) is just the same expression as (1) and (2) above. It is the expected value of utility, which is given by multiplying the utility value at each uncertain wealth level times the associated probability and summing these products.

Next, take the total differential of (4) and set this equal to zero:

$$dE(U) = \int U'(W_0, E(R) + \sigma Z)(dE(R) + Z d\sigma) n(Z;0,1) dZ = 0$$

This differential can be factored,

$$dE(R) \int U'(W_0, E(R) + \sigma Z) n(Z;0,1) dZ + d\sigma \int U'(W_0, E(R) + \sigma Z) \cdot Z \cdot n(Z;0,1) dZ = 0$$

and solved for the derivative of the expected return w.r.t. the standard deviation:

$$5. \quad \frac{dE(R)}{d\sigma} = - \frac{\int U'(W_0, E(R) + \sigma Z) \cdot Z \cdot n(Z;0,1) dZ}{\int U'(W_0, E(R) + \sigma Z) n(Z;0,1) dZ} > 0$$

What we have here is the slope of the indifference curve between risk and return. It is positively sloped. The denominator is positive. The denominator is just marginal utility, which is positive, times the normal density and integrated over all values. This is the expected value of marginal utility. Not a particularly empirical value, but clearly positive by definition.

The numerator of (5) is negative. This is so because it is marginal utility times Z times the normal density and then summed over all values. The unit normal variate, Z , takes values from minus to plus infinity and is centered on zero. This means that values of marginal utility that are below the mean wealth are weighted by negative Z values and values of marginal utility above the mean wealth are weighted by positive Z values.

This is precisely the point that our definition of risk aversion comes into play. Risk aversion means that lower wealth has a higher marginal utility than higher wealth. See the wealth and utility picture. Multiplying high marginal utility in the numerator of (5) Z weighted marginal utility is negative. Hence, the negative numerator cancels the negative sign in front and (5) is positive.

This derivation shows that the definition of risk aversion developed by drawing the distinction between expected utility of uncertain wealth and the utility of the certain money equivalent of the expected value of wealth can be translated into consumer indifference curves defined in terms of the expected return on wealth and the standard deviation (or risk) of that return. Indifference curves that measure the utility-constant tradeoff between expected return and risk are positively sloped. (They are also convex, which can be shown by taking the second derivative, that is, differentiating (5) w.r.t. s . However, we will eschew that exercise in the interest of avoiding sleeping sickness.)

As noted above, some commentators claim that the mean-variance paradigm is flawed and limited because it is founded on the assumption that the return on wealth is normally distributed. Truly, in the derivation that is shown above, the normal distribution is fully exploited. It is not likely that any of us could take the total differential of (3). It is only by converting (3) into (4) using the assumption of normality that the problem becomes tractable.

However, there is nothing wrong with simplifying a model by making assumptions. That is the scientific method. To say that the mean-variance paradigm is incomplete because we have assumed that the distribution of the return on wealth is normal, is like saying that the theory of gravity is incomplete. No doubt, it is. Works pretty good, though.

Even so, we still stand on higher ground. The distribution of the return on wealth is most appropriately modeled as normal based on the Central Limit Theorem. If wealth is held in a well-diversified portfolio, the return is the average of the returns to many assets. As such this portfolio return is a sample mean. Sample means are normally distributed.⁴

At this point in the development of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, which I think of as akin to pulling a rabbit out of a hat, all we have done is show that the hat is empty. By this, I mean that we have set the stage. We have defined the basis for utility maximization by identifying a utility function and showing what it means in the dimension that we can observe real world assets. However, utility itself is a non-observable thing. Hence, to get stock prices out of this model, we are going to have to do some tricky work.

Addendum on Preference Theory⁵

Lottery Construct

Define a simple lottery as $L = (p_1, \dots, p_N)$ where $\sum_N p_i = 1$.

Compound Lottery: A simple lottery can be the combination of other lotteries called compound lotteries: $p_i = \alpha_1 p_i^1 + \dots + \alpha_K p_i^K$

Axioms of Preference:

Continuous: Consider $L^0 \succ L^1 \succ L^2$. There exists an α such that:

$$\alpha L^0 + (1 - \alpha)L^2 \sim L^1$$

⁴ If a person's wealth were tied up in a single event (like, for instance, one's graduate education) then the distribution would arguably be binomial.

⁵ Mostly from Ch. 6, Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, *Microeconomic Theory*, Oxford Press.

Independence: Consider $L^0 \succ L^1$. Adding an alternative does not affect the ranking:

$$\alpha L^0 + (1 - \alpha)L^2 \succ \alpha L^1 + (1 - \alpha)L^2$$

This is quite different from consumer theory under uncertainty and leads to some paradoxes.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern *expected utility function*:

If there exists a set $\{u_1, \dots, u_N\}$ such that for every simple lottery $L = (p_1, \dots, p_N)$ we have a utility function $U(L) = u_1 p_1 + \dots + u_N p_N$, then that function is of the vN-M expected utility form.⁶

With the vN-M expected utility form, the utility of a lottery can be thought of as the expected value of the utilities, u_i , of the N outcomes.

$$\text{Expected utility form is linear: } U\left(\sum \alpha_k L_k\right) = \sum \alpha_k U(L_k)$$

vN-M expected utility functions are transformable by linear operators:

$$\tilde{U}(L) = \beta U(L) + \gamma$$

$$\tilde{U}\left(\sum \alpha L\right) = \beta U\left(\sum \alpha L\right) + \gamma = \sum \alpha [\beta U(L) + \gamma] = \sum \alpha \tilde{U}(L)$$

These are cardinal utility functions. The difference in the level of utility matters.

$$u_1 - u_2 > u_3 - u_4 \Rightarrow .5u_1 + .5u_4 > .5u_2 + .5u_3 \Rightarrow L^0 = (.5, 0, 0, .5) \succ L^1 = (0, .5, .5, 0)$$

Allais' Paradox:

1st prize: \$25 mil.; 2nd prize: \$5 mil; 3rd prize: 0.

4 lotteries:

$$L_1^0 = (0, 1, 0)$$

$$L_1^1 = (.1, .89, .01)$$

$$L_2^0 = (0, .11, .89)$$

$$L_2^1 = (.1, 0, .9)$$

Assume that $L_1^0 \succ L_1^1$; how do the last two compare. Note that

$$L_1^1 = L_1^0 + (.1, -.11, .01)$$

$$L_2^1 = L_2^0 + (.1, -.11, .01)$$

Therefore it should be true that:

$$L_2^0 \succ L_2^1$$

Most people will probably not rank this way. What does it mean?

⁶ Note that the lottery setup simply allows us to consider multiple outcome. The actual utility function that maps these outcomes in a von Neumann-Morgenstern way can be as simple as $U = \ln(W)$ if we are only concerned with monetary bundles.

Risk Aversion:

The utility of certain wealth is greater than the expectation of the utility of the wealth outcomes that are equivalent to that certain wealth.

$$\int u(w)dF(w) < u\left(\int wdF(w)\right)$$

(Draw concave function in utility and wealth space.) Consider $W \pm \varepsilon$. Let $c(\varepsilon)$ be the certain wealth that yields the same utility as the expected value of the uncertain outcomes around W .

Let $\pi(\varepsilon)$ be the adjustment in probability that makes the consumer indifferent to certain wealth of W and the uncertain outcome, i.e.,

$$[.5 + \pi](W + \varepsilon) + [.5 - \pi](W - \varepsilon)$$

(interpret via picture)

Insurance:

Initial wealth: W ; probability of loss D : ρ .

Outcome without insurance: $(1 - \rho)W + \rho(W - D)$

Insurance: q is cost of insurance per \$1 of coverage; A is the amount of coverage.

Outcome with insurance: $(1 - \rho)(W - Aq) + \rho(W - Aq - D + A)$

Consumer maximizes:

$$\max_{\{A\}} Z = (1 - \rho)u(W - Aq) + \rho u(W - Aq - D + A)$$

FOC:

$$-q(1 - \rho)u'(\text{no loss}) + \rho(1 - q)u'(\text{loss}) = 0$$

Let insurance be competitive and have no admin or agency costs: $q = \rho$. Thus,

$$u'(\text{no loss}) = u'(\text{loss}) \Rightarrow (W - Aq) = (W - Aq - D + A) \Rightarrow A^* = D$$

If the consumer can insure at actuarially fair rates, the risk averse consumer will fully insure.⁷

Choice with Risky Assets:

Safe Asset: zero return; no risk. \$1 maintains its value with certainty.

Risky Asset: return of r such that $\int (1 + r)dF(r) > 1$; that is, \$1 in the risky asset will on average be worth more than \$1 at the resolution of uncertainty.

Initial wealth, W ; A is the amount of W in the risky asset; B is the amount in the safe asset.

Consumer's problem:

$$\max_{\{A, B\}} \int u(A \cdot (1 + r) + B)dF(r) \text{ s.t. } A + B = W$$

or

⁷ SSOC show that it is only the risk averse consumer that does this: $u'' < 0$ for risk averse individual.

$$\max_{\{A\}} \int u(W + A \cdot r) dF(r) \text{ s.t. } 0 \leq A \leq W$$

$$\text{FOC: } \int u'(W + A \cdot r) \cdot r \cdot dF(r) = 0$$

FOC cannot be satisfied at $A = 0$ because at $A = 0$, $u'(W) \left[\int r dF(r) \right] > 0$

Implies that the consumer faced with a fair gamble and positive return will always accept some risk.

Pratt-Arrow Risk Aversion:

Absolute: $r_A = -u''(W) / u'(W)$

The more concave the utility function, the more risk aversion measured in $c(\varepsilon)$ or $\pi(\varepsilon)$.
(draw pic)

Decreasing $r_A \Rightarrow$ take on more risk as wealth increases. Can be shown by change in $\pi(\varepsilon)$ as wealth increases. (draw pic)

Relative Risk Aversion: $r_R = -W \cdot u''(W) / u'(W)$

Decreasing $r_R \Rightarrow$ decreasing r_A